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IN SEARCH OF STRAIGHTFORWARD RULES:
THE BURGER COURT'S EXPANSION OF THE
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
affords the people protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures by mandating the issuance of a warrant.' The pur-
pose of the warrant requirement is to prevent "unreasonable"
government intrusions into the privacy of the people. The
warrant clause effectuates this protection by demanding that
the determination of the existence of probable cause to con-
duct a search be made "by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."' The Supreme
Court continually expresses a preference for warrants
throughout its opinions.3 Available studies tend to show, how-
ever, that the Court's preference for warrants is more fiction
than fact.4 Warrantless searches are presently sanctioned:
© 1982 by Stephen Gibbs
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
3. The Court has stated that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is
that 'searches' conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454 (1971) (citation omitted).
4. LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures
into the "Quagmire," 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 27 (1972). See also T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 48 (1969); L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTEN-
BERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 105 (F. Remington ed. 1967).
Comparison of total number of search warrants issued with the arrests is
equally illuminating. In 1966 the New York Police [Department] ob-
tained 3,897 warrants and made 171,288 arrests. It is reliably reported
that in San Francisco in 1966 there were 29,084 serious crimes reported
to the police, who during the same year obtained only 19 search
warrants.
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upon consent,5 in "hot pursuit" situations,6 to prevent immi-
nent destruction of evidence, where an automobile's mobility
makes the securing of a warrant impracticable, 8 and incident
to a lawful arrest.'
Searches incident to arrest, the subject of this Comment,
account for more than 90 percent of all searches.10 The preva-
lence of the search incident to arrest exception and its insula-
tion from judicial examination indicates that the exception
has, in reality, replaced the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment.
The Supreme Court, in Chimel v. California,' held that
the proper scope of a search incident to arrest is the "arrestee
and his area of immediate control. . ." This definition was
an attempt by the Court to limit the unreasonably broad
searches that had been conducted under United States v. Ra-
binowitz,'" while preserving the law enforcement interest in
protecting the arresting officer and preventing the destruction
of evidence. The Chimel Court's failure to patently employ
the analysis of Terry v. Ohio,'4 however, has resulted in broad
constructions of Chimel's "area of immediate control" stan-
dard. In addition, Chimel's failure to address the problem of
third parties on the arrest premises has led to the emergence
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, 493-94 (Proposed Official Draft,
1975), cited in 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEiZURE-A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 265 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE].
5. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntary consent validates
search absent probable cause or exigent circumstances); Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (prosecutor has burden of proof to show consent freely and
voluntarily given).
6. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 295-300, 310 (1967) (warrantless search of
house valid because police had probable cause to believe armed robbery suspect had
entered only minutes before).
7. Schmerber v. California, 394 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (blood sample forcibly
taken from arrestee suspected of driving while intoxicated).
8. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
9. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (full search of passenger com-
partment of automobile and all containers within is justified by custodial arrest of
occupant); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973) (full search of per-
son justified exclusively by custodial arrest); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(custodial arrest authorizes search of person and area within his immediate control).
10. L. TIFFANY, D. MclNTYiw & D. ROTENRERO, supra note 4, at 122.
11. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
12. Id. at 763.
13. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). See infra text accompanying notes 49-52.
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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of the "protective sweep" doctrine 5 whereby officers are per-
mitted to search the arrest premises for potential third par-
ties. Together, these factors have prevented Chimel from
stemming the abuses of Rabinowitz.
Subsequent decisions by the Burger Court have led to the
serious undermining of Chimel and further erosions of the
warrant requirement. The Court's decisions in United States
v. Robinson" and Gustafson v. Florida17 held that the search
incident to arrest exception applies to all arrests, including
those for traffic violations" and crimes for which no evidence
can possibly be found. The Court's granting of a per se right
to search, with no possibility of court review, was a departure
from traditional fourth amendment analysis requiring a case-
by-case examination of warrantless searches. United States v.
Edwards's upheld, as incident to the arrest, a search of the
defendant's person that was remote in time and place from
the act of taking the defendant into custody. Edwards under-
cuts Chimel's requirement that a search incident to arrest
must be contemporaneous with the arrest. In New York v.
Belton,20 the Court applied Chimel to the search of an auto-
mobile pursuant to the arrest of its occupants. Belton adopted
a "straight forward" rule allowing the search of the automo-
bile interior and all containers found within, irrespective of
the circumstances of the arrest." This approach and the
Court's repeated citations to Robinson create uncertainties as
to the continued viability of Chimel. In addition, Belton can-
not be satisfactorily reconciled with the Court's previous deci-
sion in United States v. Chadwick.22
This Comment will first trace the inconsistent develop-
ment of the search incident to arrest doctrine leading up to
Chimel. It then analyzes Chimel and shows how its protec-
15. See Kelder & Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Recurrent Ques-
tions Regarding the Propriety of Searches Conducted Contemporaneously within an
Arrest on or Near Private Premises, 30 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 973 (1979); see also Aaron-
son & Wallace, A Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment's Doctrine of Search
Incident to Arrest, 64 GEo. L.J. 53, 70-72 (1975).
16. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
17. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
18. 414 U.S. at 235.
19. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
20. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
21. Id. at 459.
22. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See infra text accompanying notes 116-124.
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tions have been circumvented by lower court interpretations.
Next, an examination of Robinson, Gustafson, and Edwards
will show how the Court's analysis has undermined Chimel.
Finally, it will focus on Belton, its conflicts with Chadwick,
and the dangers of applying Robinson to area searches.
II. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT: Weeks THROUGH Rabinowitz
A striking aspect of the historical development of the
search incident to arrest doctrine is the Supreme Court's lack
of consistency. The Court's decisional twists, turns, and rever-
sals have been the subject of extensive commentary.28 The
search incident to arrest doctrine is an example of "how a hint
becomes a suggestion, is loosely turned into dictum and is
finally elevated to a decision."'" The doctrine first surfaced in
the Court's opinions in three cases, none actually involving a
search incident to arrest, decided early in the twentieth cen-
tury: Weeks v. United States,8 Carroll v. United States,'
and Agnello v. United States.'7
Weeks involved a series of warrantless searches of the de-
fendant's home during which personal papers, later used as
evidence against the defendant, were seized.28 The Court in
Weeks stated in dicta that the right "to search the person of
the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the
fruits or evidence of crime . ..has been uniformily main-
tained in many cases."" The Carroll Court upheld the war-
rantless search of an automobile that police had probable
cause to believe contained contraband liquor.8 0 In an "embel-
lishment of the Weeks statement,"8 the Carroll Court, again
in dicta, explained the scope of a search incident to arrest to
23. See e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. at 68-86 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
supra note 4, at 266-70, 408-10; Aaronson & Wallace, supra note 15, at 55-60.
24. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
25. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
26. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
27. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
28. 232 U.S. at 386-87.
29. Id. at 392. The Court failed, however, to cite any American precedent for
this statement.
30. 267 U.S. at 158-59.
31. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-(1969).
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"whatever is found upon his person or in his control .... ,
In Agnello, the Court invalidated the warrantless search of
the defendant's home subsequent to the defendant's arrest a
few blocks away.83 The Agnello Court, citing Carroll and
Weeks, stated: "The right ... to search persons lawfully ar-
rested while committing crime and to search the place where
the arrest is made . . . is not to be doubted."" As Justice
Frankfurter later observed in United States v. Rabinowitz,8
"[i]f such a right was 'not to be doubted' it certainly cannot
be supported by the cases cited."8
The issue of the permissible scope of a search incident to
arrest was first squarely presented to the Supreme Court in
Marron v. United States.8 7 The police in Marron, while exe-
cuting a search warrant, observed criminal behavior by the de-
fendant. Pursuant to the defendant's arrest the police seized
evidence not covered by the warrant. The Marron Court held
that police could search for and seize all items connected with
criminal activity in the immediate possession and control of
the arrestee. The Court construed the area of the arrestee's
immediate control broadly, holding it to extend throughout
his entire business establishment.8
In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,83 decided
four years after Marron, and on similar facts, the Court held
unconstitutional a warrantless search incident to arrest.4 0 Dis-
tinguishing Marron, the Go-Bart Court found the police had
adequate time to obtain a warrant and had not witnessed any
criminal activity at the time of arrest."1 The Court narrowed
the scope of a permissible search incident to arrest, prohibit-
ing a "general search or rummaging of the place," and re-
quired that the search be limited to things "visible and acces-
32. 267 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added).
33. 269 U.S. at 30-31.
34. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
35. 339 U.s. 56 (1950).
36. Id. at 77 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In Weeks, the Court confirmed the
right to search the person of the arrestee. 232 U.S. at 392. In Carroll, the Court ex-
panded the scope of the search to include items found upon the arrestee or in his
control. 267 U.S. at 158. In neither case did the Court make reference to the right to
search the place where the person is arrested.
37. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
38. Id. at 198-99.
39. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
40. Id. at 358.
41. Id. at 357-58.
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sible and in the offender's immediate custody."'42 Go-Bart was
reaffirmed one year later in United States v. Lefkowitz," an-
other case involving a general search pursuant to the defen-
dant's arrest. The Lefkowitz Court held the search unconsti-
tutional and warned that "an arrest may not be used as a
pretext to search for evidence."
The Court performed a complete turnaround fifteen years
later in Harris v. United States,' upholding a thorough
search of the defendant's four room apartment as a proper
search incident to arrest. Within a year the Court distin-
guished Harris, holding in Trupiano v. United States"s that a
valid arrest did not legitimize a warrantless search. 47 Trupi-
ano suppressed evidence seized pursuant to the defendant's
arrest, even though the evidence was in plain view, because
the police failed to obtain a search warrant when they had
ample opportunity to do 80.48
Trupiano was overruled two years later in United States
v. Rabinowitz." Rabinowitz signaled the decline of all fourth
amendment rights of an arrestee. Relying on Harris, the Rabi-
nowitz Court upheld the complete search, pursuant to arrest,
of the defendant's office, including his desk, safe, and files.
The search was upheld despite the obvious intent of the of-
ficers to conduct a warrantless search and the adequate op-
portunity to obtain a warrant prior to the arrest.50 The Court
announced that the new test for searches incident to arrest
was "not whether it is reasonable to secure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable."'" The Rabinowitz
test discouraged police from obtaining search warrants by im-
plying that warrants are not required for a search pursuant to
42. Id. at 358.
43. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
44. Id. at 467.
45. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
46. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
47. "The mere fact that there is a valid arrest does not ipso facto legalize a
search or seizure without a warrant. .. . [T]here must be some other factor.. . that
would make it unreasonable or impractical to require the arresting officer to equip
himself with a search warrant." Id. at 708.
48. Id. at 705.
49. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
50. Id. at 65-66. "The arresting officers were accompanied by two stamp ex-
perts, whose sole function was to examine the fruits of the search they knew would be
made." Id. at 85 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 66.
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arrest. Thus, Rabinowitz encouraged warrantless searches of
the arrest premises, absent probable cause or any showing of
need based on the circumstances of the arrest." These abuses
led the Court to reach a compromise in Chimel v. California.5 3
III. Chimel: THE WARREN COURT'S COMPROMISE
Rabinowitz and Harris were overruled by the Warren
Court's landmark decision, Chimel v. California," ' which now
controls the scope of searches incident to arrest. Chimel con-
sidered the constitutionality of the warrantless search of the
defendant's entire house and garage pursuant to his arrest in
his home.55 The Court's holding in Chimel narrowed the scope
of a search incident to arrest to "the arrestee's person and the
area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to
mean the area from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence." 6 The Court properly dif-
ferentiated between the arrestee's privacy interests in his per-
son, and his privacy interest in his house, papers, and effects
upon his arrest. Consequently, Chimel "reached the long over-
due conclusion that a person's home may not be subjected to
a warrantless search merely because he happens to be arrested
there."5
Although the holding in Chimel dealt specifically with the
physical scope of a search incident to arrest, the Court also
reaffirmed the requirement that the search must be contem-
poraneous with the arrest."
52. Although Rabinowitz remained good law for 19 years, it was the subject of
critical commentary. See e.g., Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest,
1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 261; Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incidental to Arrest,
78 YAu L.J. 433 (1969); The Supreme Court 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 117-22
(1967).
53. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 753-54.
56. Id. at 763.
57. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE, supra note 4, at 267.
58. "The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified ... by the need to
seize weapons ... as well as the need to prevent destruction of evidence of the
crime.... But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or
place from the arrest." Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). In Preston,
the defendant was arrested for vagrancy while parked in his car. His car was im-
pounded and subsequently searched. Evidence was found during a search of the car
that led to his conviction for conspiracy to rob a bank. The search was held unconsti-
tutional as being too remote in time and place to be incident to arrest.
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In contrast to the broad unlimited power to search that
had been exercised by the police under Rabinowitz, Chimel
was viewed by some as too restrictive because it limited the
area of search to the arrestee's "immediate control."59 Chimel
has, however, apparently been less restrictive than these com-
mentators contend.
A. The Chimel Loophole
Chimel, by allowing a search justified solely by the arrest
event but limiting the search to the area of the arrestee's "im-
mediate control," attempted to balance the law enforcement
needs of protecting the arresting officer and preventing the
destruction of evidence against the fourth amendment privacy
interests of the arrestee. The subsequent inability of Chimel
to strike this balance can be tied to the Court's failure to pa-
tently employ the traditional two-step fourth amendment
analysis of Terry v. Ohio.e0 The Terry analysis requires a dual
inquiry: "[first], whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception, and [second], whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place."" Chimel approved the first step of the Terry
inquiry in dicta only and thereby implied that a search is jus-
tified in every arrest. This permits the police to, in effect, cre-
ate their own exigency in order to effectuate a search. By di-
rectly using only the latter half of the Terry inquiry, Chimel
allowed lower courts to approve searches without any objec-
tive showing of need based on the circumstances of the
arrest. 2
59. See Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police Response, 45 NoTRE DAME
LAW. 559 (1970) (Chimel overruled 19 years of precedent and seriously hampered ef-
fective police work through its severe limitation of searches incident to arrest).
60. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer may conduct a limited frisk for weapons if he rea-
sonably believes that criminal activity is afoot and that the suspect may be armed).
61. Id. at 20.
62. See Aaronson & Wallace, supra note 15, at 60-62; Kelder & Statman, supra
note 15, at 985-90. A strong argument can be made, however, that Chimel did in fact
through its quotations of previous cases, intend that a search be limited by the need
presented in each case. "The scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to and justified
by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Chimel, 395 U.S. at
762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19). Later the Chimel Court discussed Peters
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1969), and said, "[In Peters] [w]e emphasized that the
arresting officer 'did not engage in a thorough going examination of Peters and his
personal effects.... .'" 395 U.S. at 764. The Chimel Court also quoted from Preston
v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964): "The rule allowing contemporaneous
1094 [Vol. 22
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B. The Lower Courts' Broad Interpretation of Chimel
The effectiveness of Chimel's prohibition against broad,
unjustified area searches has been seriously undermined by
subsequent lower court interpretations of the arrestee's "area
of immediate control." The "immediate control" standard has
been interpreted so broadly as to give the arrestee "the skill of
Houdini and the strength of Hercules. . . ." In United
States v. Patterson, " the defendant's wife was arrested at
home pursuant to an arrest warrant charging her with utter-
ing a forged instrument. The defendant's home was searched
while he and his wife were detained in the living room by five
officers. The officers seized a manila envelope out of a par-
tially open kitchen cabinet. The contents of the envelope im-
plicated the defendant in the robbery of a safety deposit
box." Even though Patterson can only be viewed as a rum-
maging search for evidence, the court of appeals held that the
search of the kitchen was reasonable in order to insure the
officers' safety."
The emergence of the "protective sweep" doctrine, 7
which allows arresting officers to immediately search the
premises for possible third parties to insure the officer's
searches is justified . . . to prevent destruction of evidence of the crime. . . ." 395
U.S. at 764 (emphasis added). "Evidence of the crime" is an overt requirement of a
nexus between the arrest and the objectives of the search.
63. United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). Some examples of the broad interpretation given to
the suspect's "area of immediate control" are contained in United States v. Matlock,
558 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir. 1977) (seizure of arrestee's briefcase, believed to contain
weapons, from wife's possession valid even though arrestee in patrol car); United
States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 90 (1974)
(gun seized from coat in closet while arrestee detained on bed); United States v. Ci-
otti, 469 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 1151
(1973) (stolen credit cards seized from briefcase while arrestee handcuffed); Aaronson
& Wallace, supra note 15, at 70-72; Cook, Warrantless Searches Incident to Arrest,
24 ALA. L. Rav. 607, 612-26 (1972); Kelder & Statman, supra note 15, at 984-90; and
Note, Search and Seizure Since Chimel v. California, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1011, 1015-20
(1971).
64. 447 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1971).
65. Id. at 425-26.
66. Id. at 426-27. The court claimed that the defendant's wife, although in the
living room and guarded by five officers, could have had access to the kitchen cabinet,
"by merely turning around." Id.
67. See Kelder & Statman, supra note 15. See also Aaronson & Wallace, supra
note 15, at 75-78; LaFave, supra note 4, at 27; Comment, Third Party Destruction of
Evidence and the Warrantless Search of Premises, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 111, 117-21.
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safetye and to prevent the destruction of evidence,e9 has re-
sulted in the further undermining of Chimel.70 Since thorough
searches of the premises are routinely sanctioned in "protec-
tive sweep 7 1 cases, the police have extensive opportunity to
legitimately seize any evidence "inadvertently" observed in
plain view, 7 1 even though the item was not within the arres-
tee's area of immediate control. The Supreme Court implicitly
approved protective sweeps, despite their erosion of Chimel,
in the recent case of Payton v. New York. 7 ' The Payton Court
commented:
It is true that the area that may legally be searched is
broader when executing a search warrant than when exe-
cuting an arrest warrant in the home. See Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752. This difference may be more theo-
retical than real, however, because the police may need
to check the entire premises for safety reasons, and
sometimes they ignore the restrictions on searches inci-
dent to arrest.74
The broad interpretation of the "area of immediate control,"
allowing officers to search the room in which a suspect is ar-
rested, and any room into which he may move, combined with
the officer's ability to seize evidence in plain view in any room
the officer moves through or looks into pursuant to a protec-
tive sweep,75 reduces the present day Chimel standard to a
"sort of functional paradigm of what a reasonably prudent po-
lice officer now knows he can accomplish by arranging to ar-
rest a suspect at home. ''17
68. See, e.g., United States v. Looney, 481 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1070 (1973); United States v. Briddle, 436 F.2d 4, 7 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971).
69. See e.g., United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974).
70. In 29 out of 86 "protective sweep" cases analyzed, the precipitating arrest
occurred outside the premises. Kilder & Statman, supra note 15, at 982 n.16. See e.g.,
United States v. Spanien, 597 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir. 1979).
71. Kilder & Statman, supra note 15, at 979 n.15.
72. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 n.24 (1971) (plurality
opinion).
73. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Payton held that an arrest warrant is required to enter
the home of the arrestee in order to effect his arrest. Id. at 603.
74. Id. at 589 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
75. Police Perjury: An Interview with Martin Garbus, 8 ClUm. L. BULL. 363,
372-73 (1972) provides a view of police abuse of the plain view exception to the war-
rant requirement.
76. Kelder & Statman, supra note 15, at 987 (police sweeps should only be al-
1096 [Vol. 22
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IV. THE BURGER COURT DISMANTLES Chimel
A. Robinson/Gustafson/Edwards
The Burger Court began its retreat from Chimel in three
cases decided in the 1973 Term: United States v. Robinson,"
Gustafson v. Florida,7 and United States v. Edwards.7 9 The
companion cases of Robinson and Gustafson addressed the is-
sue of the permissible scope of the search of a person incident
to arrest.80 Both cases involved arrests of the defendants for
traffic violations after which they were subjected to thorough
searches of their persons resulting in the discovery of illegal
drugs.8' The Court held in Robinson:
It is the fact of the lawful arrest that establishes the au-
thority to search and we hold that in the case of a lawful
custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
I
lowed upon a reasonable showing of dangerous persons on the premises or probable
cause to believe that destructible evidence is on the premises combined with the exi-
gency of an urgent necessity to execute the arrest without the delay of obtaining a
warrant). It has been suggested that in view of Justice White's dissent in Chimel,
which discussed the problems of third parties on the arrest premises, 395 U.S. at 744-
75 (1969) (White, J., dissenting), it may be reasonable to conclude that the Chimel
majority simply assumed police could "avoid those 'exigent circumstances' by simply
obtaining a search warrant before the arrest is made." LaFave, supra note 4, at 14.
For the view that any entry onto third party premises to execute an arrest war-
rant should, absent exigent circumstances, be conducted pursuant to a search warrant
see United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1978); Rotenburg &
Tanzer, Searching for the Person to be Seized, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 56 (1974); and Note,
The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem of Arrest Entries, 23 STAN. L. Rzv. 995
(1971).
77. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
78. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
79. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
80. 414 U.S. at 230. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in Robinson that
"[v]irtually all the statements of this Court affirming the existence of an unqualified
authority to search incident to a lawful arrest are dicta." Id.
81. In Robinson, the defendant had been stopped by the same officer several
days prior to his arrest. A subsequent check revealed that Robinson's license had
been revoked. The officer spotted Robinson a few days later and arrested him for
driving without a valid permit. During a search of Robinson the officer felt a lump in
the defendant's shirt pocket. He removed a crumpled cigarette package, opened it,
and found fourteen capsules containing heroin. 414 U.S. at 220-23.
In Gustafson, the defendant was stopped after the arresting officer observed him
weaving across the lane three or four times. After the defendant was unable to pro-
duce a driver's license, the officer decided to take him to the police station for further
questioning. The defendant was searched and a cigarette box which contained mari-
huana was found. 414 U.S. at 261-63.
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Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search under that
Amendment.8s
Although the Court claimed that the authority to search inci-
dent to arrest is "based upon the need to disarm and discover
evidence," under Robinson there is no objective or subjective
requirement of proof of either element in the circumstances of
the arrest.88 Robinson allowed an evidence search pursuant to
an arrest for driving with a revoked'operator's permit, a crime
for which there was no possible evidence on the arrestee's per-
son."' This was a direct rejection of the dicta in Chimel which
had approved the scope limitations set forth in Terry, requir-
ing the circumstances which initiated the search to justify its
intensity.85
The Robinson Court revived the rules approach of Rabi-
nowitz, where the Court held it was "reasonable" to search
the arrestee's entire house simply because his arrest occurred
there."' The Robinson Court held that "[t]he authority to
search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest ...
does not depend on what a court may later decide was a
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or ev-
idence would in fact be found upon the person of the sus-
pect. 8 7 The Robinson substitution of a per se rule for tradi-
tional case-by-case adjudication of fourth amendment claims
82. 414 U.S. at 235. The manner and degree of intrusiveness of the search is
governed solely by the "conduct that shocks the conscience" test of Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 414 U.S. at 236.
83. 414 U.S. at 235.
84. There was no evidence that the arresting officer believed the cigarette pack-
et to be a weapon or believed himself in danger. "On the contrary, he admitted that
he did not have any specific purpose in mind when he searched the appellant. 'I just
searched him. I didn't think about what I was looking for. I just searched him."'
United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc). The court
of appeals held that an arrest can only justify a search of the crime for which the
arrest is made. Id. at 1094. The court also held that the arresting officer may conduct
a limited frisk for weapons absent probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that the
arrestee is armed or dangerous. Id. at 1098.
85. The Robinson Court distinguished Terry. "Terry v. Ohio ...did not in-
volve an arrest for probable cause [but only] . . . an investigative stop based on less
than probable cause. . . ." 414 U.S. at 227.
An especially thoughtful criticism of the Robinson rejection of Terry is contained
in Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and the Criminal Process: Directions
and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 518, 540-46 (1977).
86. The Warren Court subsequently rejected the inflexible rules approach of
Rabinowitz in Chimel and substituted a scope determination in light of fourth
amendment principles. 395 U.S. at 765, 768.
87. 414 U.S. at 235 (emphasis added).
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was a serious departure from precedent."'
Prior to Robinson, searches directed toward uncovering
evidence of crimes unconnected to the crime for which the ar-
rest was made had been clearly illegal.89 By allowing a full
search of an individual arrested for a traffic violation, and by
eliminating any possible judicial examination of the underly-
ing circumstances,9° Robinson allows avoidance of the prohibi-
tion of searches for evidence of other crimes through pretext
arrests. Since "in most jurisdictions and for most traffic of-
fenses the determination of whether to issue a citation or ef-
fect a full arrest is discretionary with the officer,"'" it is al-
most certain that a zealous officer, following a suspect long
enough, can find some violation of the traffic code and effect a
warrantless search.2
United States v. Edwards"s provided another opportunity
to undermine Chimel. Edwards confronted the issue of how
contemporaneous to an arrest a search must be in order to be
incident to that arrest. In Edwards, the defendant was ar-
rested for attempted burglary and jailed. Ten hours after his
arrest, while he was incarcerated, the defendant's clothing was
seized from his person without a warrant. Paint chips found
on the clothing were used as evidence against the defendant.'
The court of appeals held that the ten hour delay prevented
the search from meeting the contemporaneous requirement of
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant require-
88. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). "There is no
formula for reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circum-
stances." Id. at 351.
This aspect of Robinson has been the subject of severe criticism by some com-
mentators, e.g., Comment, Searches Incident to Arrest: The Expanding Exception to
the Warrant Requirement, 63 GEo. L.J. 223, 231 (1974) and Note, United States v.
Robinson: Chipping Away at the Fourth Amendment, 1 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 334, 341
(1974).
89. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932); Amador-Gonzales
v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1968).
90. 414 U.S. at 235.
91. Id. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures":
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. Rav. 127 suggests that inquiring "under what
circumstances a physical taking of custody is a justifiable means for invoking the
criminal process" might be the means of preventing the potential abuse inherent in
Robinson. Id. at 157.
93. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
94. Id. at 801-02.
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ment." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an arrest
was a continuing process and that ten hours was a "reasonable
delay."" Edwards seriously undermines the Chimel standard
of contemporaneity for a valid search incident to arrest.9 7
In addressing the ability of the police to have obtained a
warrant, the Court, citing Cooper v. California" said, "[ilt
was no answer to say that the police could have obtained a
search warrant," for the Court held "the test to be not
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search itself was reasonable, which it was." 99 The
Court's reliance on Cooper is misplaced. Cooper was not based
on the search incident to arrest doctrine, but on a state stat-
ute authorizing searches of impounded vehicles.100 Rather
than rely on Cooper, the Court should have looked to Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire01 which instructs that an object that
may be searched at the time of arrest cannot later be seized
and searched without a warrant at the pleasure of the
police.102
By rejecting the demands of Chimel to procure a warrant
whenever possible and by substituting a "reasonableness" ap-
proach for the search, Edwards comes dangerously close to re-
viving the "reasonableness test" of Rabinowitz, rejected out-
right in Chimel.
B. New York v. Belton: Robinson Applied to Areal
Container Searches
The most recent search incident to arrest case decided by
the Supreme Court is New York v. Belton.10 3 Even though
Belton is an area search case, its repeated citations to Robin-
95. United States v. Edwards, 474 F.2d 1206, 1211-13 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415
U.S. 800 (1974). Seizures pursuant to police practices are not an exception to the
warrant requirement. Justifications for search incident to arrest cease once the arrest
process is complete. Id. at 1213.
96. 415 U.S. at 804-05.
97. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1969).
98. 396 U.S. 58 (1967).
99. 415 U.S. 807, citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added).
The Edwards Court failed to note that Cooper's approach was later rejected in
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969).
100. 386 U.S. at 60-62 & n.1.
101. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
102. Id. at 457. Coolidge also stated that Cooper was inapplicable to searches
incident to arrest. Id. n.12.
103. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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son may sound the death knell for Chimel. In addition, Belton
is in direct conflict with the Court's 1977 decision in United
States v. Chadwick.10 4 In Belton, an automobile containing
the defendant and three other men was stopped for speeding.
As he spoke with the driver, the officer smelled the odor of
burnt marihuana and observed an envelope marked
'Supergold' on the floor of the car. The officer associated this
type of envelope with marihuana.105 He ordered the men out
of the vehicle, patted them down for weapons and placed
them under arrest. On returning to the car, he seized the en-
velope from the floor and searched the rest of the passenger
compartment. On the back seat he found defendant's leather
jacket and inside a zippered pocket found cocaine.106 The trial
court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine
and the defendant appealed. The New York Court of Appeals
relied on United States v. Chadwick10 7 and Arkansas v.
Sanders'"5 in holding the search and seizure unconstitu-
tional.109 The court reasoned that the search was not incident
to arrest because the officer had gained "exclusive control"
over the jacket and "there [was] no longer any danger that the
arrestee or a confederate [might] gain access to the article." 1 0
The Supreme Court based its opinion on Chimel rather
than Chadwick and Sanders. Terming the "area of immediate
104. 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (warrantless search of luggage or personal property not
immediately associated with the person, after its reduction to exclusive police control
and absent exigent circumstances, held not a valid search incident to arrest).
105. 453 U.S. at 456.
106. Id.
107. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
108. 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (automobile exception of Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970) allowing warrantless searches of automobiles on probable cause does
not apply to personal luggage found within the automobile).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Ross, 102 S.Ct. 2157
(1982), has partially overruled Sanders and expanded the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. See infra note 125. Ross permits the search, based on prob-
able cause, of all containers found in an automobile, including personal luggage, ex-
cept where the officer's probable cause is limited to a single, particular item. For
example, if an officer has probable cause to believe that contraband is being trans-
ported in a green suitcase, then a search is limited to any green suitcase found in the
suspect's automobile. If, however, the officer simply possesses probable cause to be-
lieve that contraband is being transported somewhere in the vehicle, then all contain-
ers capable of concealing the contraband may be searched. 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170-71.
This creates the novel situation where the less information the police have, the less
restricted they are in their ability to search.
109. 50 N.Y.2d 447, 451, 407 N.E.2d 420, 423, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (1980).
110. Id. at 449, 407 N.E.2d at 423, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576-77.
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control" standard of Chimel "difficult to apply in specific
cases," ' the Court chose the "straightforward rule" 1 2 ap-
proach of Robinson. It held that pursuant to the custodial ar-
rest of an occupant of an automobile, the passenger compart-
ment is always within the arrestee's "immediate control"
under Chimel, therefore the police may conduct a full search
of the passenger compartment and the contents of all con-
tainers found within.118
The Court in Belton, by characterizing the search as one
incident to arrest, has directly resolved the issue of whether
"the 'grabbing distance' authorized in the Chimel case is con-
ditioned upon the arrestee's continued capacity 'to grab' ,,14
in a manner directly in conflict with the rationale behind
Chimel. In Belton, the defendant was removed from the car,
frisked and then placed under arrest. Only then did the officer
go back to the car and search. " 5 At the time of his search of
the car the officer was not in danger because he had already
searched the arrestees for weapons. The officer had the envel-
ope of marihuana in his possession so that there was no op-
portunity for destruction of the evidence. By allowing the of-
ficer to go back and search the car after the arrests and hold
that search as being incident to arrest, Belton, under the guise
of Chimel, allows a search of the area the arrestee could have
reached prior to his arrest."' The defendant was totally una-
ble to "gain possession of a weapon or destructible evi-
dence":1 1 7 Chimel's justification for allowing the search of the
arrestee's area of "immediate control.""' 8 Here, Belton and
United States v. Chadwick'19 cannot be reconciled despite the
legal fiction given Chimel's area of "immediate control" in
Belton. Chadwick held:
111. 453 U.S. at 458.
112. Id. at 459.
113. Id. at 460.
114. People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 508, 300 N.E.2d 139, 143, 346
N.Y.S.2d 793, 799 (1973).
115. 453 U.S. at 456.
116. Under the facts and holding of Belton it would seem that an officer could
place a defendant under arrest, handcuff him, put him in the patrol car and then go
back to the defendant's car and search a locked briefcase seized from the backseat of
the car.
117. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763.
118. Id. See 453 U.S. at 466-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or
other personal property not immediately associated with
the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and
there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain
access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evi-
dence, a search of that property is no longer an incident
of the arrest.2 0
Although the Court in Belton attempted to distinguish Chad-
wick by the fact that the search in Chadwick occurred one
hour after defendant's arrest,121 Chadwick held that items are
reduced to exclusive police control "from the moment" of the
arrest. 2 In Belton, with the defendant under arrest outside
the automobile, the automobile's contents were under the "ex-
clusive control" of the officer. 23 Under Chadwick, "when no
exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate
search, the Warrant Clause places the line at the point where
the property to be searched comes under the exclusive domin-
ion of police authority. 1 124 Chadwick clearly mandates that in
Belton the officer should have locked the car, brought the ar-
restee to the police station, had the vehicle impounded, and
then procured a search warrant for the automobile.
It might be argued that the "automobile exception 1 25 to
the warrant requirement under United States v. Ross16 and
120. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
121. 453 U.S. at 462.
122. 433 U.S. at 4.
123. This was the theory of the New York State Court of Appeals, but that
court applied it only to the jacket. "Once defendant had been removed from the auto-
mobile and placed under arrest, a search of the interiors of a private receptacle safely
within the exclusive custody and control of the police may not be upheld as an inci-
dent to his arrest. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753." 407 N.E.2d 420, 423, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 577. Justice Stewart summarily
dismissed this argument in a footnote: "But under this fallacious theory no search
nor seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest would ever be valid; by seizing an
article even on the arrestee's person, an officer may be said to have reduced that
article to his 'exclusive control.'" 453 U.S. at 461 n.5. Justice Stewart, however, fails
to grasp Chadwick's distinction between the seizure of a container and the search of
its contents. See People v. Laiwa, 122 Cal. App. 3d 190, 206-07, 175 Cal. Rptr. 840,
850 (1981) (White, P.J., dissenting).
124. 433 U.S. at 15.
125. The automobile exception allows a warrantless search "where there is
probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable,
the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a war-
rant must be obtained." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (citations
omitted).
126. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). See supra note 108.
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Carroll v. United States"2 7 should apply, allowing the officer
to search the automobile based on probable cause alone. This
reasoning would not apply to Belton, however, because the of-
ficer only had probable cause to search for the marihuana he
smelled. This probable cause evaporated as soon as he seized
the envelope containing marihuana.'2 5 Any further intrusion
must require a warrant.
The Court's justification for allowing searches of the con-
tents of containers, "if the passenger compartment is within
reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his
reach,""' is a simple bootstrap of the fiction that the whole
interior is always within his reach. The Court's further justifi-
cation for the search, that a lawful arrest always overrides an
arrestee's privacy interest in any container which he may pos-
sess,"'0 directly contradicts Chadwick. The Chadwick Court
stated that "[u]nlike searches of the person, [United States v.
Robinson . . .], searches of the possessions within an arres-
tee's immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced ex-
pectations of privacy caused by the arrest."181 Furthermore,
by including luggage in its definition of containers, 32 Belton
produced the curious result of allowing a warrantless search of
luggage within the passenger compartment incident to arrest
and absent probable cause, although under Chadwick' 33 and
Sanders,'3' even the presence of probable cause did not jus-
tify search of the luggage without a warrant. 3 5
127. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
128. "Meanwhile, the policeman had smelled burnt marihuana and had seen on
the floor of the car an envelope marked 'Supergold' that he associated with mari-
huana." 453 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 460 (footnote omitted).
130. 453 U.S. at 461. The court stated that containers may be searched "since
the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the
container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justified the infringement of any pri-
vacy interest the arrestee may have." Id.
131. 433 U.S. at 16 n.10.
132. 453 U.S. at 460 n.4.
133. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
134. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
135. 453 U.S. at 472 (White, J., dissenting). This inconsistency was later reme-
died by the Court's subsequent decision in United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157
(1982), which permits a warrantless search based on probable cause of any luggage
found in an automobile. See supra note 108. Justice Powell, in Sanders, made these
observations about luggage:
[A] suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on the highway is not
necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associ-
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The Belton Court cites Robinson's justification for unlim-
ited searches of the person incident to arrest and extends this
rationale to container searches: "A custodial arrest of a sus-
pect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under
the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search
incident to arrest requires no additional justification. ' ' 13 6 Al-
lowing the search of a locked briefcase without any "addi-
tional justification" other than the defendant's arrest, seems
totally inconsistent with the fourth amendment's mandate
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
ated with luggage taken from other locations. One is not less inclined to
place private, personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suit-
case is to be carried in an automobile. . . Indeed, the very purpose of a
suitcase is to serve as a repository for personal items when one wishes to
transport them.
442 U.S. at 764 (footnote omitted).
In his concurring opinion to Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 429 (1981)
where he discusses his views on Belton, Justice Powell now appears to trade "margi-
nal privacy of containers within the passenger area of an automobile for protection of
the officer and of destructible evidence." Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
136. 453 U.S. at 461 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235). The
danger of using Robinson as authority for the search of containers is evidenced by the
application of Belton by the California Court of Appeal in a case now awaiting review
before the California Supreme Court: People v. Laiwa, 122 Cal. App.. 3d 190, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 840 (1981), hearing granted (Crim. 22259) Oct. 2, 1981. In Laiwa, the defen-
dant, walking in a parking lot, appeared to police to be under the influence of
phencyclidine (PCP). A test for nystagmus (jerky eye movement) confirmed their sus-
picions. The officer took the defendant's handbag from him and placed him under
arrest. He was then handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. His handbag was subse-
quently searched and found to contain PCP. The court applied Belton to the search
and said:
Other courts have apparently also read Chadwick too broadly. In
People v. Minjares, supra, 34 Cal. 3d 410, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d
514, our Supreme Court . . . [i]n dictum . . . stated, 'It is clear from
Chadwick itself that the tote bag would not have been subject to a war-
rantless search if appellant had been-arrested on the street and the bag
taken from his possession. . . .' (At pp. 419-420, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224, 591
P.2d 514.) However, in light of Belton, it is apparent that Chadwick
simply does not declare the standard against which to assess the validity
of a search incident to a lawful arrest.
Although in Belton the search was of an automobile, the court made
clear that its holding applied to all custodial arrest searches. The court
cited Chimel v. California .... [and] clarified the application of that
holding as it applied to automobile searches. It is clear therefore that
the search here did not offend the federal constitutional provisions
against warrantless searches.
122 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
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seizures shall not be violated .... ,,137
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court routinely begins its analysis
of fourth amendment cases by expressing its preference for
search warrants, a search pursuant to a search warrant is now
the exception rather than the general rule. Whereas a search
warrant must name the place to be searched and the things to
be seized,"58 a search incident to arrest is almost devoid of
practical limitation. The limited research that exists on search
warrants shows a marked police tendency not to obtain search
warrants, even when there is adequate time, unless mandated
to do so by the courts. Through its approval of unlimited
searches incident to arrest, Rabinowitz actually discouraged
police from obtaining warrants."' In Chimel, the Warren
Court attempted to stem the abuses of Rabinowitz while
maintaining law enforcement interests. Lower court construc-
tions of Chimel, however, have skewed its balance in favor of
law enforcement officers, resulting in continued infringement
of fourth amendment rights.
Burger Court decisions have further eroded Chimel and
the warrant requirement. Robinson allows warrantless
searches of the person for evidence, irrespective of whether
any evidence can possibly exist for the crime for which the
arrest is made. Edwards, by upholding a search ten hours af-
ter the defendant's arrest as incident to the arrest, seriously
undercuts Chimel's contemporaneity requirement. Belton
purports to apply Chimel but continually cites to Robinson.
Belton's per se rule, allowing searches of personal containers
and luggage, safely insulates police conduct from judicial scru-
tiny, thereby inviting pretext arrests and other abuses. Conse-
quently, Belton is in direct conflict with Chadwick's determi-
nation that an arrestee's fourth amendment expectations of
privacy in his possessions do not evaporate upon his arrest.
Although Chief Justice Burger claims that the Court is "con-
struing the Constitution, not writing. . . a manual for law en-
forcement officers,"' 40 the Court's decisions in the search inci-
137. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
138. Id.
139. L. TIFFANY, D. McINT'Ry & D. Ro'rNBURo, supra note 4, at 100.
140. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 768 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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dent to arrest area cloud this assertion. It is now clear that in
search of "straightforward rules" the Court is abandoning the
fourth amendment's core principle, that "[t]he scope of [a]
search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circum-
stances that rendered its initiation permissible.
14 1
Stephen Gibbs
141. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at
110719821

